El valor bélico de la cabalgada en la frontera de Granada (c. 1350-c. 1481)

Authors

  • Manuel Rojas Gabriel Departamento de Historia, Área de Historia Medieval, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Extremadura

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/aem.2001.v31.i1.284

Keywords:

Military History, Granada Kingdom, Frontier

Abstract


In this article, the author starts from the notion that the frontier between Castile and Granada was, above all, a war front where military actions sometimes acquired the characteristics of an open war with great military operations. Some other times, the conflict was reduced to low intensity predatory actions and surprise attacks against some small strongholds. From this double dimension of war stemmed the cavalry raid and acquired its importance as an essential strategic and tactical instrument. From this point of view, the author analyses how the cavalry raid was the main ingredient of the war routine. For the Castilians, it was a very effective wearing element within a general strategic plan whose ultimate and non hidden purpose was the defeat and occupation of the Emirate. For the weakening Moslems, the plundering raids on the Christian frontier were almost the only means to drive the hostilities against their adversdaries in Andalucía and Murcia.

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Published

2001-06-30

How to Cite

Rojas Gabriel, M. (2001). El valor bélico de la cabalgada en la frontera de Granada (c. 1350-c. 1481). Anuario De Estudios Medievales, 31(1), 295–328. https://doi.org/10.3989/aem.2001.v31.i1.284

Issue

Section

Miscelaneous Studies